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ARE DEBT-FOR-CLIMATE SWAPS MORALLY PERMISSIBLE?i 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Environmental degradation is a problem as immense in scope as it is horrific in detail. 
Climate change, in particular, threatens many species and ecosystems.ii Failing to mitigate climate 
change risks inter alia stronger hurricanes, massive droughts, loss of biodiversity, the spread of 
disease, and the long-term flooding of coastal areas around the world.iii Another problem as 
immense and horrific as environmental degradation is extreme poverty. Over 1 billion people are 
living in extreme poverty, unable to secure adequate food, shelter, clothing, healthcare, clean 
water and sanitation.iv Eighteen million people die every year from such poverty-related causes as 
malaria, AIDS, and starvation.v Debt-for-climate swaps might help to solve both problems.  
    Debt-for-climate swaps (and, more generally, debt-for-nature swaps) are agreements 
between creditors – either developed countries or international financial institutions – and 
developing country debtors. In bilateral swaps, a creditor agrees to forgive a developing country’s 
debt on the condition that the developing country fund and implement a domestic environmental 
program (e.g., to preserve forests). Generally, non-governmental conservation organizations such 
as the World Wildlife Fund or Conservation International broker these bilateral swaps. 
Sometimes, however, debt-for-climate swaps are three-party agreements between a creditor, a 
non-governmental conservation organization, and a developing country debtor. In commercial 
swaps, creditors sell a developing country’s debt to a conservation organization at a reduced rate. 
Then the conservation organization agrees to forgive part or all of the debt so long as the 
developing country funds and implements a domestic conservation program.vi Dozens of 
countries have participated in debt-for-climate (and other debt-for-nature) swaps.vii 
Environmentalists praise such swaps for their potential to mitigate environmental 
degradation.viii In 2002 debt-for-nature swaps topped Time Magazine’s list of most promising 
conservation strategies and the recent climate crisis has added impetus to the move towards debt-
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for-climate swaps.ix Such swaps have already helped create large nature preserves. In 1987, for 
instance, Conservation International brokered a swap that created Bolivia's Beni Biosphere 
Reserve.x In 2007, Peru agreed to protect ‘7.5 million acres of tropical rain forest containing pink 
river dolphins, jaguars, scarlet macaws and giant water lilies.’xi And more recently, in 2009, 
Conservation International brokered a swap that will purportedly preserve Sumatra’s forests and 
protect its many endangered species.xii  
Others praise debt-for-climate (and nature) swaps for their potential to alleviate extreme 
poverty.xiii Developing countries often face crushing international debt burdens, which can 
interfere with their ability to eliminate – or, at least, alleviate – extreme poverty within their 
borders.xiv Because debt-for-climate swaps reduce the amount of money developing countries 
must spend servicing their debts, such swaps may help these countries lift their people out of 
extreme poverty.xv At first blush, then, debt-for-climate swaps seem to provide win-win solutions 
to the problems of environmental degradation and extreme poverty. As such, one might naturally 
assume that debt-for-climate swaps are morally permissible, if not morally obligatory.  
This paper will argue that, appearances not withstanding, debt-for-climate swaps may 
sometimes be morally questionable, if not impermissible. The upshot of the paper is threefold: 
first, it is unwise to assume without scrutiny that any particular debt-for-climate swap is morally 
permissible; second, and more generally, it is important to exercise some degree of moral 
imagination when reflecting on the permissibility of actions for which there are allegedly no 
better alternatives; third, it may turn out that national and international policies, rules, and 
institutions must change in order to make many seemingly innocuous or even good policies or 
actions like debt-for-climate swaps permissible.  
Our argument is motivated by an analogy between international loans and debt-for-
climate swaps. In particular, the argument draws on structural similarities between the economic 
conditions traditionally placed on international loans to developing countries (economic 
conditionality) and the environmental conditions placed on debt-for-climate swaps 
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(environmental conditionality). So, after setting out the moral framework we use to evaluate the 
permissibility of debt-for-climate swaps, we will discuss some moral problems that have been 
attributed to economic conditionality. We will then show how similar problems may apply to 
debt-for-climate swaps both in theory and in practice. Finally, we will entertain some objections 
to our argument.  
Inquiry into the permissibility of debt-for-climate swaps is important in the context of 
debates about how we should mitigate climate change. Consider that, as a result of its Tropical 
Forest Conservation Act, the U.S. signed twelve debt-for-nature agreements with countries 
including Panama, Bangladesh, Botswana, Belize, Costa Rica, Colombia, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Jamaica, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and the Philippines.xvi  By 2006, the U.S. had 
already saved a million acres of forest with such swaps.xvii If we use what seems to be a 
conservative estimate of .5 metric tons of carbon saved per acre, then these swaps have saved 
around 500,000 metric tons of carbon from entering the atmosphere per year. (For a frame of 
reference, global emissions are about 7 billion tons per year.)xviii Furthermore, as some developing 
countries have proposed that they be allowed to sell their carbon credits in exchange for debt 
relief, it seems that debt-for-climate swaps hold great potential for dealing with global climate 
change, whether used in lieu of, or in addition to, traditional carbon trading programs.xix Although 
many discuss the permissibility of different carbon-trading regimes, we know of few papers 
examining the permissibility of debt-for-climate swaps. 
II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND EXTREME POVERTY 
This paper will work within a human rights framework, which assumes that we all 
possess human rights in virtue of our humanity and that we all have an equal claim to their 
fulfillment.xx Human rights have traditionally been understood as the rights necessary to secure 
individuals’ basic interests and/or autonomy.xxi To stay neutral between these competing accounts 
of human rights, however, this paper will simply say that people have a human right to the things 
they need to secure a minimally decent life (so that whatever interests or autonomy individuals 
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must be able to secure are included here).xxii We have human rights to those things that are 
necessary for living a minimally decent life and against those things that are detrimental to living 
a minimally decent life.xxiii  
On this framework, we have a human right against extreme poverty—or, alternatively, a 
human right to what we need in order to avoid extreme poverty. For extreme poverty poses a 
common threat to individuals’ ability to live minimally decent lives. It is worth noting how 
uncontroversial this assumption is. Whatever a minimally decent life requires, surely it requires at 
least those things essential for sustaining life itself, and these are ex hypothesi the very things put 
at risk by extreme poverty.  
Now supposing that everyone has a human right against extreme poverty, it is incumbent 
on us (i.e., humanity) to ameliorate it. But just what does it mean to lay responsibility for securing 
the human rights of everyone at the doorstep of humanity? What does it mean to say the duties 
that arise from human rights are duties of humanity? Here, we might follow James Nickel who 
provides a clear and plausible answer: 
(1) governments are the primary addressees of the human rights of their residents, with 
duties both to respect and to uphold their human rights; (2) governments have negative 
duties to respect the rights of people from other countries; (3) individuals have negative 
responsibilities to respect the human rights of people at home and abroad; (4) individuals 
have responsibilities as voters and citizens to promote human rights in their own country; 
and (5) governments, international organizations and individuals have back-up 
responsibilities for the fulfillment of human rights around the world.xxiv 
 It is helpful to separate the negative duties from the positive duties that arise from human 
rights. On the one hand, negative duties that arise from human rights are addressed to all of 
humanity all of the time: each of us, along with our governments, and non-governmental 
organizations, has a duty to avoid taking actions, implementing policies, and supporting 
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institutions that help undermine human rights anywhere at anytime.xxv It is, for instance, always 
incumbent on both Kenyans and U.S. citizens, along with the Kenyan government and the United 
States government, and (say) the World Bank and the World Wildlife Fund, to avoid taking 
actions, implementing policies, and supporting institutions that undermine the human rights of 
either Kenyans or Americans in this way (henceforth simply undermine). On the other hand, 
positive duties that arise from human rights are not addressed to all of humanity. Rather, they 
begin as domestic duties and, if necessary, become international duties.xxvi It is, for instance, the 
primary duty of the Kenyan government – not (say) the United States government, the World 
Bank, or the World Wildlife Fund – to take actions, implement policies, and support institutions 
that secure the human rights of Kenyans. Similarly, it is the primary duty of the United States 
government – not (say) the Kenyan government, the World Bank, or the World Wildlife Fund – 
to take actions, implement policies, and support institutions that secure the human rights of U.S. 
citizens. When a country is unable to secure the human rights of its people, however, it becomes a 
secondary (positive) duty of the international community – requiring not just states but 
individuals and non-governmental organizations – to assist. So, for instance, if the Kenyan 
government is unable to secure the human rights of its people, and if the United States 
government has already fulfilled its primary duty to secure the human rights of its people, then, 
other things being equal, it is the responsibility of the United States government – along with 
similarly capable members of the international community – to assist in securing the human rights 
of Kenyans.xxvii 
 There is even some basis for this interpretation of the duties correlative to human rights 
in international law. Consider, for instance, Article 2(1) of the international covenant on 
economic and social rights, part of the UN declaration of human rights as explicated in the 
general comments.xxviii It says that to fulfill rights: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant …[must undertake]… steps, individually 
and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and 
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technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant 
by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures. 
The third general comment states: 
The Committee notes that the phrase [in Article 2(1)] ‘to the maximum of its 
available resources’ was intended by the drafters of the Covenant to refer to both 
the resources existing within a State and those available from the international 
community through international cooperation and assistance. The Committee 
wishes to emphasize that in accordance with Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of 
the United Nations, with well-established principles of international law, and with 
the provisions of the Covenant itself, international cooperation for development 
and thus for the realization of economic, social and cultural rights is an obligation 
of all States. It is particularly incumbent upon those States which are in a position 
to assist others in this regard.xxix  
In other words, although states have the primary obligation of ensuring that their subjects’ human 
rights are secure, other states and international organizations that are well placed to do so must 
provide assistance if necessary.  
One might question the above human rights framework on which everyone has a human 
right against extreme poverty that gives rise to high-priority duties (on humanity) to ameliorate 
extreme poverty. Specifically, one might wonder just how demanding the duty on humanity to 
ameliorate extreme poverty should be.  
Our answer to this question is simple: humanity must ameliorate extreme poverty as 
much as possible without sacrificing something of comparable moral significance.xxx Of course, 
one might then wonder what sorts of goals compare with ameliorating extreme poverty. Or, more 
generally, one might wonder what justifies us in adopting this human rights framework in the first 
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place. However, such questions go beyond the scope of this paper. It simply assumes that the 
above moral framework is justifiable. This is not to say that adopting a human rights framework 
is uncontroversial, but rather that (provisionally) doing so can help to illuminate potential moral 
shortcomings in the case of debt-for-climate swaps. Before using this framework to assess the 
morality of debt-for-climate swaps, however, it is helpful to consider some problems associated 
with structurally similar international loans. 
III. INTERNATIONAL LOANS AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONALITY 
Loans are conditional. Creditors make loans on the condition that their debtors will pay 
them back, usually with interest. In international lending, however, economic conditionality has 
become more complex and restrictive. Developing countries seeking international loans – 
whether from more affluent countries or international financial institutions like the World Bank 
or International Monetary Fund – must often agree to implement economic reforms designed to 
promote macroeconomic stability and growth. They may require countries to: 
• Liberalize trade (say) by reducing tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. 
• Liberalize financial markets (say) by allowing world markets to dictate exchange 
rates or devalue local currencies against hard currencies such as the dollar. 
• Diminish the role of the state in guiding the economy (say) by privatizing major 
sectors of the economy, decreasing government bureaucracy, and reducing 
spending on such things as healthcare, education, and welfare.xxxi 
In short, international loans have traditionally been conditional on liberalization, deregulation, 
and privatization. Although the conditions on international loans continue to evolve in order to 
address worries about their timing, content, and efficacy, most international creditors remain 
committed to advancing these kinds of reforms.xxxii  
Some international loans that have traditional economic conditions attached are morally 
questionable, if not impermissible. At least such loans are impermissible if they undermine the 
ability of debtor countries to protect the human rights of their people now or in the future. Given 
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the moral framework set forth in §II, it is the duty of humanity to ensure that all people are able to 
live minimally decent lives. On this view, an international loan is permissible only if it protects 
the human rights of people whose lives are affected by it. So, if meeting the conditions on an 
international loan prevents a debtor country from protecting its people from extreme poverty, the 
loan is prima facie impermissible. International creditors – whether countries or international 
financial institutions – have a duty to ensure that the conditions they place on their loans preserve 
the ability of debtor countries to protect their people from extreme poverty. That is to say, 
international loans ought to be sustainable: as we will understand ‘sustainability,’ an international 
loan is sustainable only if the debtor country can protect its people from extreme poverty while 
servicing the conditions of the loan.
 
Although this way of construing sustainability might sound unorthodox, it is at least 
closely connected to the traditional understanding. To be sustainable, a practice must not 
compromise the fundamental interests or autonomy of individuals in present or future 
generations. Although questions about sustainability are most often asked in the context of 
environmental practices, they can just as well be asked in the context of economic practices. 
Finally, while this paper focuses on the human interests associated with sustainability, nothing we 
say here precludes the relevance of environmental interests to questions of sustainability. 
Unfortunately, there appear to be real-world cases in which international loans with 
traditional economic conditions attached are unsustainable. In 1998, for instance, the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund worked with the Bolivian government to privatize its public 
enterprises – including Bolivia’s water company (SEMAPA) – as a condition of giving Bolivia a 
loan.xxxiii Subsequently, when the Bechtel Corporation took over the Bolivian water supply, many 
poor Bolivians saw their water bills triple or quadruple. In March 2000, Bolivians took to the 
streets in protest—demanding affordable water. Although Bechtel eventually relented,xxxiv it 
appears that Bolivia was unable to protect the human rights of its people while servicing the 
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conditions on its loan. If so, the requirement on Bolivia to privatize its water supply was 
unsustainable and, therefore, morally questionable.  
In another case, the International Monetary Fund required Ecuador to privatize its water 
and sewage system as a condition of giving Ecuador a loan. Although service improved in some 
respects, poor infrastructure led to an outbreak of hepatitis A, and poor Ecuadorians suffered as 
prices rose and subsidies were eliminated. As a result, some suggest that, in some parts of 
Ecuador, the poor were unable gain access to clean water and sanitation: 76% of the residents of 
Plan Piloto, for instance, characterized their water as ‘turbulent and foul smelling’; 45% said it 
was ‘yellow or dark’; and 74% said it smelled like feces.xxxv It thus appears that Ecuador was 
unable to protect the human rights of its people while servicing the conditions on its loan. If so, 
the requirement on Ecuador to privatize its water and sewage system was unsustainable and, 
therefore, morally questionable.  
 Finally, in a third case, the International Monetary Fund pressured Niger to put a 19 
percent value-added tax on goods – including foodstuffs – as a condition of giving Niger a loan. 
The tax was levied even though food costs had risen more than 75 percent in the previous five 
years, and even though Niger’s nomadic herders’ main source of income (livestock) had fallen 25 
percent in value.xxxvi Although causation is notoriously hard to prove, there was famine in Niger 
that year, and the tax may well have been an aggravating factor.xxxvii It thus appears that Niger 
was unable to protect the human rights of its people while servicing the conditions on its loan. If 
so, the requirement on Niger to impose a 19 percent value-added tax on goods – including 
foodstuffs – was unsustainable and, therefore, morally questionable.  
IV. DEBT-FOR-CLIMATE SWAPS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONALITY 
Now we turn to the permissibility of debt-for-climate swaps. International loans with 
traditional conditions attached are structurally similar to debt-for-climate swaps. Just as 
international loans require debtor countries to institute certain economic programs, debt-for-
climate swaps require debtor countries to institute certain environmental programs. Both 
                                                                                                    DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS 
 
 
10 
institutions exhibit the following structure: Creditor C will do X for debtor country D if and only 
if D institutes program P. The moral framework set out in §II places a sustainability condition on 
all such transactions: if a debtor country D is unable to institute program P while securing the 
human rights of its people (say, by protecting them from extreme poverty), then the transaction in 
question – whether an international loan or a debt-for-climate swap – is morally questionable, if 
not impermissible. We know from our discussion in §III that at least some international loans 
with traditional conditions attached are morally questionable for this reason, and, given the 
structural similarity between such loans and debt-for-climate swaps, we have reason to subject 
debt-for-climate swaps to a similar level of moral scrutiny.  
Although debt-for-climate swaps are supposed to reduce a debtor country’s international 
debt burden, this may not be enough for those offering such swaps to have discharged their moral 
duties to the people in that country. Whether those offering (or brokering) debt-for-climate swaps 
have discharged these duties depends on whether the swaps are sustainable—a matter for 
empirical inquiry. Such inquiry must examine whether a debtor country can fulfill the conditions 
on a debt-for-climate swap while maintaining the necessary economic growth, domestic 
infrastructure, and/or redistributive mechanisms sufficient for securing the human rights of its 
people. Suppose, for instance, that the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) brokers a debt-for-climate 
swap between the U.S. and Indonesia, in which the U.S. agrees to forgive US$100 million of 
Indonesian debt so long as Indonesia agrees to institute a US$20 million conservation program 
designed to protect its tropical rainforest. The permissibility of such a swap will depend on inter 
alia its sustainability: the US$20 million conservation program must not prevent Indonesia from 
maintaining the economic growth, infrastructure, and redistributive mechanisms necessary to 
protect current and future generations of Indonesians from extreme poverty. 
One might object that a debt-for-climate swap is permissible as long as it benefits a 
debtor country and its people. Rather than sustainability, one might say, perhaps the appropriate 
moral standard is that a swap just leave a country better able to secure the rights of its people. 
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Indeed, one might insist that swaps are only problematic if they make a country less able to 
secure the rights of its people.xxxviii 
While this may be so on some moral framework, it is not so on the human rights 
framework set out in §II. This is because a swap can lighten a country’s debt burden, increase its 
ability to fulfill the rights of its people, and still prevent the country from completely fulfilling 
these rights. Suppose, for instance, the U.S. offers to reduce Indonesia’s debt obligations if it 
agrees to create a nature reserve in a debt-for-climate swap. Even if the swap improves 
Indonesia’s political power and the average welfare of Indonesians, for instance, creating the 
reserve could still make it more difficult (if not impossible) for Indonesia to help the very poor 
meet their basic needs. So, the permissibility of a debt-for-climate swap depends not simply on 
whether the debtor country and its people benefit from the swap. It also matters whether the 
country can protect its people from extreme poverty while fulfilling the environmental conditions 
placed on the swap.  
Nonetheless, there may be cases in which a particular debt-for-nature swap is the best a 
creditor (or broker) can do to help a debtor country protect its people from extreme poverty. 
Perhaps the level of poverty, or the level of environmental degradation, is just that severe. Such 
cases present terrible choices, where creditors (or brokers) must choose between making an 
otherwise impermissible offer and doing what (say) has better consequences for the poor or the 
environment. If an unsustainable debt-for-nature swap happens to be the morally best option 
available to a creditor (or broker), then offering (or brokering) the swap may be the right thing to 
do in the circumstances. But this is a terrible choice even if it’s easy to make and no one is 
blameworthy for having to make it.  
By classifying the right choice as terrible, one expresses an abiding interest in avoiding 
circumstances where we are forced to make ourselves complicit – however blamelessly – in the 
perpetuation of extreme poverty and, other things being equal, the violation of human rights.xxxix 
The importance of this point cannot be overstated, since it is precisely by doing this that we can 
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guard against failures of imagination which result in the unnecessary perpetuation of extreme 
poverty and human rights violations. Because the permissibility of offering (or brokering) an 
unsustainable debt-for-climate swap depends on the absence of better options, we must be sure to 
exhaust our imaginations before concluding that our best option is an unsustainable debt-for-
climate swap. If we fail to exhaust our imaginations in the effort to find feasible alternatives to 
unsustainable debt-for-climate swaps, then we make ourselves not only complicit but culpable in 
the perpetuation of extreme poverty and violation of human rights.xl Indeed, this is the more 
general thrust of our argument: we must ensure that debt-for-climate swaps, which seem 
wonderful on the surface, do not provide creditors and brokers with an all-too-easy excuse for 
their conduct in a world that allows for the perpetuation of extreme poverty.  
So far this paper has argued that debt-for-climate swaps are morally questionable when 
they are unsustainable, but there are likely other salient conditions on their permissibility—in 
addition to sustainability. We have thus far assumed that the debt being swapped for nature in 
debt-for-climate swaps comes from valid loans. But this need not be the case. The original loan 
could be odious. Odious loans are either (1) accepted by those without legitimate authority or (2) 
used for purposes that do not benefit the debtor country or its inhabitants.xli If, for instance, a 
dictator accepts a loan and embezzles the money, then that country’s citizens should not be held 
to account. Other things being equal, these loans are invalid. So it seems that the permissibility of 
debt-for-climate swaps will be contingent on the validity of the original loans underlying the 
swaps. If those involved in offering (or brokering) a debt-for-climate swap know (or should have 
known) that the original loan is invalid – say, because it’s odious or unsustainable –, then it may 
well be impermissible to offer (or broker) the swap. 
More generally, creditors and brokers in debt-for-climate swaps must be acting in good 
faith. A colloquial example is helpful here. If one buys a Bose speaker system from Target, then 
one gains valid title to the speakers even if they turn out to have been stolen, since it is rarely (if 
ever) the case that goods sold at Target are stolen. If, however, one buys a Bose speaker system 
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from a pawn shop, then the title may be invalid, since it is commonly the case that goods sold at 
pawn shops are stolen. As Leif Wenar explains: 
In order for a purchaser to act in good faith, it must be reasonable for him to believe that he 
is dealing with a genuine vendor—one with neither void nor voidable title. It must be 
reasonable, that is, for the purchaser to believe either that the vendor is the owner of the 
good or that the owner has authorized the vendor while free from deception, duress, or 
undue influence.xlii  
Similarly, if those offering (or brokering) a debt-for-climate swap are acting in bad faith, they 
have no right to insist that the debtor country meet the environmental conditions placed on the 
swap.  
There may also be other conditions on the permissibility of debt-for-climate swaps, 
though this paper will not focus upon them. Loans may, for instance, be impermissible because 
they are exploitative.xliii Exploitative loans are offered by creditors who use their disproportionate 
bargaining power to coerce debtors into accepting conditions that would not otherwise be 
reasonable to accept. A debt-for-climate swap could be impermissible because it is based on an 
exploitative loan, or because the swap itself is exploitative. For the sake of brevity, however, 
what follows will focus only on the sustainability and good-faith conditions for permissibility. 
Let us now turn to debt-for-climate (and, more generally, debt-for-nature) swaps in 
practice. Do real cases of debt-for-climate (or nature) swaps always (or generally) satisfy the 
conditions on permissibility set forth in §IV? Assuming the goodwill of all participating parties, 
this section will suggest that many may not. Debtor countries in debt-for-climate swaps (almost) 
invariably face unsustainable debt burdens. For this reason, it seems that those who offer (or 
broker) debt-for-climate swaps may be acting in bad faith—especially, since there is often little 
reason to think that the swaps will be sustainable. 
Many poor countries are highly indebted with debt-to-export ratios of over 200 
percent.xliv Often poor countries’ debt servicing obligations exceed all sources of government 
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revenue. Econometric estimates give us reason to believe many of these countries’ debts are 
unsustainable as on our definition as well as many others. The international financial institutions, 
for instance, suggest that many countries are unable to service their obligations even when they 
cut services to the poor.xlv  
A recent Jubilee report provides further evidence that massive debt is likely to prevent 
very poor countries from securing the human rights of their people. This report created a model 
for Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda on which these countries cannot continue to 
service their projected debt burdens while meeting the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of 
cutting extreme poverty in half by 2015.xlvi In the case of Malawi, for instance, the report projects 
that, by 2015, Malawi would ‘have a debt burden of at least 276% of GDP’xlvii even if Malawi 
tried to meet the MDG by excluding its existing debt and securing new loans. The report 
concludes that ‘if Malawi financed the MDG cost gap through such borrowing, it would be 
completely unsustainable.’xlviii It is hard to see how countries that have to spend all of their money 
servicing massive debts will be able to protect their citizens’ human rights from one generation to 
the next. If they are not able to do so, then, as discussed in §III above, the international loans that 
originally created the unsustainable debts are morally questionable, if not impermissible, and so, 
by extension, are any debt-for-climate swaps that serve to perpetuate such unsustainable debts in 
the form of environmental conditionality.  
One might object that the evidence does not show that swaps are undermining human 
rights in any respect. Without the swaps poor countries and their people would be worse off. The 
swaps, instead, improve countries’ ability to fulfill their subjects’ human rights. 
If one agrees, however, that traditional economic conditionality undermines human 
rights, one should agree that debt-for-climate swaps do so. For, the structure of debt-for-climate 
swaps is the same as the structure of traditional economic conditionality: Creditor C will do X for 
debtor country D if and only if D institutes program P. The moral framework set out in §II places 
a sustainability condition on all such transactions: if a debtor country D is unable to institute 
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program P while securing the human rights of its people (say, by protecting them from extreme 
poverty), then the transaction in question – whether an international loan or a debt-for-climate 
swap – is morally questionable, if not impermissible. It does not matter if, without P, some other 
requirement R (e.g., the original conditions on a loan) were in place that would also undermine a 
country’s ability to fulfill even the same people’s human rights. The basic principle does not 
include an exception for cases where more people's rights are fulfilled or fewer undermined with 
P in place. 
In light of these reflections, there is reason to worry that some debt-for-climate (or 
nature) swaps are impermissible. Some highly-indebted poor countries (HIPC) -- including 
Bolivia, Honduras, and Nicaragua -- have already received debt-for-climate (or other debt-for-
nature) swaps.xlix At least, one should be just as inclined to question the permissibility of debt-for-
climate swaps as one is to question the permissibility of the international loans on which they are 
based.  
Furthermore, many of the debts developing countries bear were taken on by corrupt and 
treacherous rulers who did not use the loans to benefit their country or their people. Nor did the 
countries or institutions making these loans have good reason to think that these rulers would use 
the loans to aid the extremely poor. Ostensibly, then, there are many odious debts. For instance, 
much of the Philippines’ debt acquired under Marcos, or Indonesia’s debt acquired under 
Suharto, is odious.l And yet, creditors have offered both the Philippines and Indonesia debt-for-
climate (and nature) swaps.li While more evidence is needed to establish that the creditors (or 
brokers) in these swaps were acting in bad faith, it seems that suspicion is warranted.  
As noted above, there may be cases in which the best option available to those offering 
(or brokering) debt-for-climate swaps is to offer (or broker) an unsustainable or bad faith swap. If 
that is the best they can do, then it may be better than doing nothing. But, again, this is a terrible 
choice, even if no one is blameworthy for having to make it. 
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V. OBJECTIONS 
Are debt-for-climate swaps uniquely wrong? 
 One might object that the paper has done nothing to show that anything is distinctively 
wrong (or questionable) about debt-for-climate swaps. After all, what are debt-for-climate swaps, 
but creative attempts by well-meaning people to address the problem of environmental 
degradation while simultaneously lessening the massive debt burdens of developing countries? 
Surely there is nothing wrong with this, and just as surely, one might argue, the paper has done 
nothing to locate the potential wrongness of debt-for-climate swaps in its analysis of the swaps 
themselves. 
 While this objection is correct in claiming that the paper does not account for the 
distinctive wrongness of debt-for-climate swaps, we believe this objection implies an absurd 
standard for evaluating the moral status of debt-for-climate swaps, or anything else for that 
matter.lii The fact that debt-for-climate swaps might be impermissible for the same reason(s) that 
other kinds of acts are impermissible does not vitiate the claim that there is reason to worry that 
something is wrong with debt-for-climate swaps. If, for instance, one were to argue that factory 
farming is wrong because it violates the principle of utility, it would be no defense of factory 
farming to respond by saying that many things can violate the principle of utility. Similarly, if one 
were to argue that lying is wrong because it violates the Categorical Imperative, it would be no 
defense of lying to respond by saying that many things can violate the Categorical Imperative. 
We argue that debt-for-climate swaps are morally questionable because those offering (or 
brokering) the swap may thereby fail to fulfill their positive obligations to the poor, if not 
undermine these rights. It is no defense of debt-for-climate swaps to respond by saying that there 
are other ways people can fail to fulfill the obligations correlative to human rights. In short, 
different acts can be impermissible for the same reason.  
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Are we asking too much of debt-for-climate swaps? 
 One might still object that we are asking too much of debt-for-climate swaps when we 
make their permissibility contingent on how they impact the poor. Extreme poverty exists for a 
variety of reasons that have little or nothing to do with debt-for-climate swaps themselves, 
including the economic actions and policies of corporations, affluent countries, international 
financial institutions, and vicious dictators. In this context, one might argue, it is a mistake to 
conclude that debt-for-climate swaps are morally questionable, if not impermissible, simply 
because they fail to make a non-ideal world ideal. 
Again, we believe this objection misses the thrust of the paper’s argument. Our point is 
that the permissibility of debt-for-climate swaps depends on how they impact individuals’ basic 
human rights. We do not conclude, as the objection suggests, that the permissibility of debt-for-
climate swaps depends on whether they provide a panacea to extreme poverty, much less all the 
world’s ills. That said, we do suppose that the circumstances in which one offers (or brokers) a 
debt-for-climate swap are relevant to its permissibility, since how a debt-for-climate swap affects 
people’s ability to secure the objects of their human rights will depend on background facts over 
which those who offer or broker the swap have no control. It makes sense to judge the 
permissibility of debt-for-climate swaps – or anything else for that matter – in accordance with 
their real-world effects, not in accordance with the effects they would have had were the world a 
much different place. Presumably, we are responsible for the actual (if foreseeable) consequences 
of our actions, not the counter-factual consequences of our actions. For instance, we cannot 
excuse ourselves for pushing somebody off the edge of a cliff simply by pointing out that (a) we 
were not responsible for him standing at the edge of a cliff, and that (b) our push would not have 
sent him over the cliff were he standing in the middle of a cornfield. Similarly, creditors and 
brokers of debt-for-climate swaps cannot excuse themselves from pushing people into extreme 
poverty simply by pointing out that (a) they were not responsible for such people being on the 
edge of extreme poverty, and that (b) the debt-for-climate swap would not have pushed people 
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into extreme poverty were the economic actions and policies of affluent countries, corporations, 
international financial institutions, or vicious dictators different. A similar argument applies in 
cases where, given existing background conditions, debt-for-climate swaps merely prevent people 
from escaping extreme poverty. 
Furthermore, the fact that the world might have to change in certain ways in order for 
certain debt-for-climate swaps to be permissible does not undermine the paper’s argument. 
Rather, it expands the significance and import of the paper, since there likely are ways of 
changing national and international policies, rules, and institutions so that they protect human 
rights better than the status quo. Thomas Pogge has argued, for instance, that we should collect a 
global tax on the use of natural resources and use the dividends to ameliorate extreme poverty.liii 
And one of us has argued elsewhere that there are ways of changing the rules of trade and aid that 
could greatly help the poor.liv No matter the efficacy of any specific proposal, however, the 
paper’s general conclusion still stands: the permissibility of debt-for-climate swaps depends (in 
part) on whether the international community exercises its collective imagination in the effort to 
eliminate extreme poverty.  
Again, this is not to deny that there may well be cases in which an unsustainable or bad 
faith debt-for-climate swap is the best option available. But, as argued in §IV, we should make 
every effort to avoid having to make such terrible choices—even if circumstances ultimately 
dictate that no one is blameworthy for having to make them. 
What about the value of nature? 
One might object that protecting nature is just as important as, if not more important than, 
securing human rights. So, the objector might suggest, a moral framework based solely on human 
rights, which lacks an environmental ethic, is inadequate to morally evaluate debt-for-climate 
swaps. Some might argue, for instance, that there is an obligation to give equal consideration to 
animal interests,lv to treat all teleological subjects of a life as members of our moral community,lvi 
or to protect species, ecosystems, and the biosphere for their own sake.lvii These people might 
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claim that, even if debt-for-climate swaps undermine the ability of people to avoid extreme 
poverty, they are permissible so long as they succeed in protecting the environment. Indeed, if a 
debt-for-climate swap will help mitigate the effects of climate change, or save some species from 
extinction, then such a swap may well be obligatory. After all, many environmentalists have 
argued for similar conclusions.lviii  
We believe, however, that this objection removes both extreme poverty and 
environmental degradation from their proper context. A concern for the poor and the environment 
are interconnected. Those who care about extreme poverty have a reason to care about 
environmental degradation and vice-versa.lix  
First, the poor are extremely vulnerable to environmental problems like climate change. 
Natural disasters and famines have harmed or resulted in the deaths of billions of poor people 
over the course of the last decade.lx Hundreds of thousands of poor people die every year from 
infectious diseases like malaria.lxi And environmental problems like climate change are likely to 
aggravate the harms to people that result from such natural causes.lxii Moreover, because people 
in extreme poverty are the most exposed to environmental degradation and the least able to adapt 
to changing environmental conditions,lxiii they are likely to suffer most from the effects of 
environmental problems like climate change.lxiv Thus, people who care about ameliorating 
extreme poverty on human rights grounds have a reason to care about mitigating environmental 
problems like climate change.  
Second, the poor, collectively, contribute a surprising amount to environmental 
degradation by using scarce sinks (like forests) that absorb wastes such as (excess) carbon 
dioxide.lxv For instance, swidden (or slash and burn) agriculture – usually employed by poor 
farmers who want to plant crops or raise cattle on marginal lands – causes immense deforestation. 
Poor people, who lack access to electricity or gas, also burn lots of wood and coal to cook their 
meals and heat their homes.lxvi Moreover, developing country emissions will rise as they start 
using more fossil fuel, and it is estimated that developing countries will emit more carbon dioxide 
                                                                                                    DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS 
 
 
20 
than industrialized countries by about 2018.lxvii People who care about mitigating environmental 
problems like climate change thus have a reason to care about ameliorating extreme poverty.  
Because extreme poverty and environmental degradation are interconnected, conflict 
between the imperatives to protect human rights and the environment is by no means certain. An 
unsustainable debt-for-climate swap that exacerbates extreme poverty may likewise exacerbate 
environmental degradation. Consider, for instance, the debt-for-climate swap that created the 
Beni Biosphere Reserve in Bolivia. The Tsimane' Indians who live in the reserve increase 
foraging and forest clearing when they are otherwise unable to meet their basic needs. These 
activities have the potential to devastate the reserve and undermine the environmental aims of the 
swap.lxviii Therefore, whether the Bolivian swap will mitigate, or exacerbate, environmental 
degradation depends on whether it will protect the ability of the Tsimane’ Indians to meet their 
basic needs. So, while debt-for-climate swaps hold out the hope of providing win-win solutions to 
the problems of environmental degradation and extreme poverty, unsustainable debt-for-climate 
swaps may well fail on both counts. Of course, the possibility of an intractable conflict between 
the needs of nature and the needs of people remains, but, again, this is compatible with the claim 
that unsustainable and bad faith debt-for-climate swaps are morally questionable. 
VI. CONCLUSION  
Debt-for-climate swaps appear to provide win-win solutions to the very large and horrific 
problems of environmental degradation and extreme poverty. We do not question the intentions 
of those who would offer (or broker) debt-for-climate swaps, and we believe that they may well 
have a role to play in the larger efforts to confront these problems. Nevertheless, this paper has 
argued that, appearances notwithstanding, debt-for-climate swaps are sometimes morally 
questionable, if not impermissible. Putting aside cases in which terrible choices must be made, 
debt-for-climate swaps, like international loans, are permissible only if they are sustainable and 
offered (or brokered) in good faith. Unfortunately, like many international loans, there is reason 
to worry that some real-world debt-for-climate (or nature) swaps have, in fact, been 
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impermissible. In any case, the practical upshot of the paper is that creditors and brokers of debt-
for-climate swaps must be vigilant to avoid offering (or brokering) unsustainable or bad faith 
swaps. Such vigilance requires that creditors and brokers of debt-for-climate swaps use their 
imaginations in order to avoid having to make terrible choices between mitigating environmental 
degradation and protecting people from extreme poverty. 
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xxvi See Pogge, 2002; Buchanan, 2007. 
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xxviii ‘[O]ver time the general comment has become a distinct juridical instrument, enabling the [Human Rights 
Committee] to announce its interpretations of different provisions of the [ICCPR] in a form that bears some 
resemblance to the advisory opinion practice of international tribunals. These general comments or ‘advisory 
opinions’ are relied upon by the Committee in evaluating the compliance of states with their obligations under 
the Covenant, be it in examining State reports or ‘adjudicating’ individual communications under the Optional 
Protocol… General comments consequently have gradually become important instruments in the lawmaking 
process of the Committee, independent of the reporting system.’ Steiner and Alston, 2000. 
xxix From: CESCR, 1990. Furthermore, the charter of the UN also expresses this understanding of the obligation 
to ameliorate poverty along with secure other conditions for stability and well being. Consider articles 55 and 56 
of Chapter IX of this charter, for instance. Article 55 says: ‘With a view to the creation of conditions of stability 
and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: a. higher standards 
of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development; b. solutions of 
international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational co-
operation; and c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.’ Article 56 says: ‘All Members pledge themselves to 
take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth 
in Article 55.’ U.N., 1945. 
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xxx See Singer’s 1972 discussion of comparable moral significance. For us, as for Singer, the idea is merely 
formal and contains no assumptions about what the content of morality requires. Admittedly, then, it may turn 
out that human rights considerations against debt-for-nature swaps are outweighed by countervailing 
considerations in their favor (e.g., the value of nature to be preserved in the swap).  
xxxi See, for example, Bello, 1996; Sachs, 2005. 
xxxii Looking at the guidebook for countries it seems privatization, liberalization and freer trade are encouraged: 
(The World Bank, 2010). Attending to the content of the particular programs implemented in developing 
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are to the old requirements (IMF, 2003). 
xxxiii IMF and World Bank, 1998. 
xxxiv Bechtel took Bolivia to court but eventually settled for a nominal amount due to international pressure. 
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xxxix Indeed, we may even be able to rationally regret having to make a terrible choice that prevents us from 
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present tragic dilemmas only because we do not want to enter into the debate about whether truly tragic 
dilemmas are possible here. See Stocker 1990, however, for more on rational regret in terrible circumstances. 
xl Author, 2009b. 
xli Gosseries, 2008. 
xlii Wenar, 2007, p. 25. 
xliii As with debt-for-nature swaps the best one may be able to do in some circumstances is offer an exploitative 
loan or give money to a bad leader, but it is terrible if that is the best one can do. We would like to thanks Henry 
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xlv Gunter, 2003. 
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